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Introduction
Hungdah Chiu*
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Great Britain annexed the island of Hong Kong under the 1842 Treaty
of Nanking' after it defeated China in the Opium War of 1839-42.
Controversies arising from attempts to open Canton (Guangdong) to for-
eign trade resulted in an Anglo-French expedition against Peking in
1858. The 1860 Treaty of Peking2 ending this conflict forced China to
cede the Kowloon Peninsula, facing the island of Hong Kong, to Great
Britain. In 1898, Great Britain, taking advantage of China's weakness,
forced China to "lease" a much larger area north of the Kowloon Penin-
sula which later became known as the "New Territories."3 The "lease"
convention, which made no provision for payment of rent, contained the
following stipulation:
It is at the same time agreed that within the city of Kowloon the
Chinese officials now stationed there shall continue to exercise jurisdic-
tion, except so far as may be inconsistent with the military require-
ments for the defence of Hong Kong. Within the remainder of the
newly-leased territory Great Britain shall have sole jurisdiction. Chi-
nese officials and people shall be allowed as heretofore to use the road
from Kowloon to Hsinan.4
Despite this provision, no Chinese government since Ch'ing (Qing in
pinyin) has sent officials to administer the City of Kowloon, which is
actually only a small enclave in Kowloon. However, when the British
Hong Kong government attempted to exercise governmental functions
there, it was occasionally denounced by the Chinese authorities.'
The three treaties through which Great Britain established its rule
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland; President of the American Association for Chi-
nese Studies, 1985-87; Editor-in-Chief, CHINESE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AFFAIRS.
1 Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, Great Britain-China, art. III, 50 British & Foreign State
Papers (Gr. Brit.) 389; 93 Parry's T.S. 465, 467.
2 Convention of Friendship, Oct. 24, 1860, Great Britain-China, art. VI, 50 British & Foreign
State Papers (Gr. Brit.) 10; 123 Parry's T.S. 71, 73-74.
3 Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898, Great Britain-China,
reprinted in 1 HERTSLET'S CHINA TREATIES 130 (3d ed. 1908); 186 Parry's T.S. 310.
4 1 HERTSLET'S CHINA TREATIES, supra note 3, at 130; 186 Parry's T.S. 310.
5 See, e.g., China Protests Against British Attempt to Demolish Premises in Kowloon City, New
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over Hong Kong were considered by the Chinese Nationalist Party as
"unequal treaties." One of the major goals of the Nationalist Revolution
was to abrogate the "unequal treaties" and to recover Chinese territories
lost to foreign countries.6
II. CHINESE POLICY TOWARD THE HONG KONG QUESTION
During the Second World War, when Great Britain was negotiating
with the Republic of China ("ROC") government for the termination of
British extraterritorial and other special rights in China, the Chinese gov-
ernment demanded the termination of the 1898 "lease" of the so-called
"New Territories." The British government refused. In order not to de-
lay the abrogation of British extraterritorial and other special rights in
China, the Chinese side finally agreed to drop the issue of the Kowloon
leased territories, but it made clear that it reserved the right to reopen
negotiations in the future. Therefore, the Sino-British Treaty on the Ab-
rogation of British Extraterritorial and Other Special Rights signed on
January 11, 1943,1 did not deal with the 1898 lease. Later, through U.S.
mediation, the ROC proposed designation of Hong Kong and the Kow-
loon Peninsula, previously ceded to Great Britain, as a free port if Great
Britain agreed to return Hong Kong, Kowloon and the "New Territo-
ries" to China. Great Britain did not respond to this proposal.'
In late 1949, Communist forces defeated the ROC government and
the latter moved to Taiwan. On January 5-6, 1950, Great Britain with-
drew its recognition of the ROC (Nationalist) government, and the ROC
has not subsequently been in a position to negotiate the Hong Kong
question with Great Britain.
Despite its nationalistic, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist policy,
the People's Republic of China ("PRC") has an important stake in main-
taining Hong Kong's prosperity since it acquires a substantial amount of
foreign exchange through its trade with Hong Kong. Moreover, Hong
Kong provides an outlet for Chinese political dissidents and serves to
reduce the political tension at home and indirect contacts with Taiwan
such as mail and trade. For these reasons, although the PRC has consid-
ered Hong Kong as Chinese territory to be recovered, there had been no
attempt to implement that goal until 1982. An editorial in the authorita-
China News Agency-English (Peking), Jan. 17, 1963, reprinted in 1 J. COHEN & H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 377 (1974).
6 Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal Treaties, in
CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 248-56 (J. Cohen ed. 1972).
7 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TREATIES BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND FOR-
EIGN STATES 1927-1957, at 589-602 (Republic of China 1958).
8 THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG: TOWARD 1997 AND BEYOND 4 (H. Chiu, Y.C. Jao, and Y.
L. Wu eds. 1987).
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tive People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) of March 8, 1963, explained the
PRC's policy toward Hong Kong as follows:
At the time the People's Republic of China was inaugurated, our
government declared that it would examine the treaties concluded by
previous Chinese governments with foreign governments, treaties that
had been left over by history, and would recognize, abrogate, revise, or
renegotiate them according to their respective contents.
As a matter of fact, many of these treaties concluded in the past
either have lost their validity, or have been abrogated or have been
replaced by new ones. With regard to the outstanding issues, which
are a legacy from the past, we have always held that, when conditions
are ripe, they should be settled peacefully through negotiations and
that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be maintained.
Within this category are the questions of Hong Kong, Kowloon, and
Macao and the questions of all those boundaries which have not been
formally delimited by the parties concerned in each case.9
The same editorial also pointed out that "there is no need for the Chinese
people to prove their courage and staunchness in combating imperialism
by making a show of force on the question of Hong Kong."'10
Although, until recently, the PRC was willing to maintain the status
quo of Hong Kong, it made clear that it would not tolerate Hong Kong
becoming an independent state. In 1964 the Soviet-sponsored World
Youth Forum adopted a resolution putting Hong Kong and Macao on a
par with Timor Island, Papua, Oman, Aden, and South Arabia and de-
manded "independence" for these places in accordance with the 1960
United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Countries and People. The PRC delegates strongly protested the
adoption of such a resolution."
After its entry into the United Nations, when the PRC found that
the General Assembly's Special Committee on Colonialism included
Hong Kong and Macao in its list of colonial territories, the PRC sent a
letter to the Committee's Chairman on March 10, 1972, stating that:
Hong Kong and Macao are part of Chinese territory occupied by
the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the questions
9 A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the USA., People's Daily (Renmin
Ribao), Mar. 8, 1963, at 1 (editorial), reprinted in 1 J. COHEN & H. CHIU, supra note 5, at 380.
10 Id.
11 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People, G.A. Res.
1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960), reprinted in I. BROWNLIE,
BASic DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (3d ed. 1983). The operative part of this Declara-
tion reads: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
Id. at 300.
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of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within China's sovereign right
and does not at all fall under the ordinary category of colonial
territories.
Consequently, they should not be included in the list of colonial
territories covered by the declaration on the granting of independence
to colonial countries and people.
With regard to the questions of Hong Kong and Macao, the Chi-
nese government has consistently held that they should be settled in an
appropriate way when conditions are ripe. The United Nations has no
right to discuss these questions.1
2
III. SINO-BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF
HONG KONG
In September 1982 Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister,
visited the PRC and raised the subject of Hong Kong with both Premier
Zhao Ziyang and Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission Deng
Xiaoping. According to well-informed sources, Deng told Mrs. Thatcher
that when China recovers sovereignty, the British flag and the British
governor would have to go, and China would take steps to ensure Hong
Kong's prosperity. Thatcher emphasized the importance of continuing
Hong Kong's links with the United Kingdom if the territory was to be
preserved as a bustling commercial and financial center, but she left open
the possibility that something could be worked out to satisfy China's de-
mand that the United Kingdom recognize Chinese sovereignty over
Hong Kong. At the end of Thatcher's visit, a joint communique was
issued stating that both countries "agreed to enter talks through diplo-
matic channels following the visit, with the common aim of maintaining
the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong."' 3
During the two years of hard and sometimes frustrating negotia-
tions, land values and stock prices plunged and the Hong Kong dollar
lost at least 50% of its value. Many individuals began making plans to
emigrate to foreign countries and some companies began making plans to
seek fortunes abroad.' 4
On September 26, 1984, the United Kingdom and the PRC initialed
the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong. The Joint Decla-
ration was formally signed on December 19, 1984 and the instruments of
ratification were exchanged on May 27, 1985.t1
The Joint Declaration contains more than 8,000 words and is, per-
12 Khrushchet' Group Turns World Youth Forum Into Anti-China Forum, New China News
Agency-English (Moscow), Sept. 25, 1964, reprinted in 1 J. COHEN & H. CHIU, supra note 5, at 381.
13 Hong Kong Is Chinese Territory, People's Daily, Aug. 20, 1967, at 2 (letter cited in commen-
tary), reprinted in J. COHEN & H. CHIU, supra note 5, at 384.
14 F. CHING, HONG KONG AND CHINA: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE 12 (1985).
15 Id. at 5.
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haps, the second longest international agreement ever concluded by the
PRC.16 It spelled out in detail the PRC's policy toward Hong Kong, the
post-1997 Hong Kong regime, and its international relations. The high-
lights of the Joint Declaration are as follows:
1. After 1997, Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative
Region of the PRC under article 31 of the PRC Constitution.1 7
It will enjoy a "high degree of autonomy" except in foreign and
defense affairs.
2. Hong Kong will be vested with executive, legislative, and in-
dependent judicial power, including that of final adjudication.
3. Hong Kong's chief executive will be appointed by the PRC after
elections or consultation in Hong Kong. The government of
Hong Kong will be composed of local people.
4. Hong Kong shall maintain the capitalist economic and trade
systems for fifty years after 1997.
5. The existing social and economic system will remain un-
changed. Freedom of speech, movement, the press, assembly,
strike, and religion and other freedoms will be protected by law.
Similarly, private property rights will be protected.
6. Apart from displaying the national flag and national emblem of
the PRC, Hong Kong may use a regional flag and emblem of its
own.
18
7. Hong Kong may participate in relevant international organiza-
tions and international trade agreements. It may establish offi-
cial and semi-official economic and trade missions in foreign
countries, using the name "Hong Kong, China" to maintain
and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements
with states, regions, and relevant international organizations in
appropriate fields.
8. The PRC defense force stationed in Hong Kong shall not inter-
16 45 FACTS ON FILE, May 15, 1985, at 412-43 (No. 2323). For the text of the Declaration and
related documents, see Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of
Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, Great Britain-China, 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmd. 9352), reprinted
in 23 I.L.M. 1366 [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
17 The longest P.R.C. treaty is the 1962 boundary treaty with Mongolia. Boundary Treaty of
1962, Dec. 26, 1962, China-Mongolia, 1962 Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Tiaoyue Ji (People's
Republic of China) 117. See also CHIU & JOHNSTON, AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA, 1949-1967: A CALENDAR.
18 Article 31 provides: "The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary.
The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by
the National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions." XIANPA (Constitution) art.
31 (People's Republic of China) [hereinafter P.R.C. CONST.]. In line with this, article 62(13) of the
Constitution provides the National People's Congress with the power "to decide on the establish-
ment of special administrative regions and the systems to be instituted there." Id. art. 62(13).
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fere in the internal affairs in Hong Kong and the expenditures
for these military forces shall be borne by the PRC's Central
People's government.
9. The PRC's National People's Congress will enact a Basic Law
to implement the Joint Declaration.
The public reaction in Hong Kong was generally favorable, as ob-
served by Frank Ching:
Most people who took part in public discussions found the agree-
ment much more detailed, and more reassuring, than they had ex-
pected. One feature of the Joint Declaration, however, that many
Hong Kong residents are unhappy about is its reference to the station-
ing of Chinese troops in Hong Kong. Several Chinese leaders had said
troops would not be sent, and some Hong Kong residents see China's
reversal on this issue as a sign that it may also renege on other
commitments.
Missing from the Joint Declaration is a statement as to whether
China will conscript Hong Kong youths to serve in the armed forces.
The British pressed for [such] a declaration, and the Chinese said their
policy was not to draft men from Hong Kong. But they refused to
incorporate such a pledge in the Joint Declaration. Taken as a whole,
however, the agreement-in all its detail and the care with which it
was negotiated-signaled China's desire to reassure Hong Kong resi-
dents of its intention to abide by it.19
Internationally, the agreement was well received by the United
States, Japan, Southeast Asian countries and Western European coun-
tries,2° all of whom have a stake in the continuation of the stability and
prosperity of Hong Kong-the third largest financial center of the
world-in the post-1997 period.
IV. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF RETURNING HONG KONG TO
CHINA IN 1997
After the announcement of the Joint Declaration, the financial and
real estate markets in Hong Kong gradually recovered and, at least on
the surface, the city began to thrive again. But as to whether this phe-
nomenon will continue until 1997 and beyond, there is, of course, no
simple answer. One should not question the PRC's intention and sincer-
ity in regard to maintaining Hong Kong's prosperity in the post-1997
period, because there is no reason and no benefit for the PRC in seeing
19 F. CHING, supra note 14, at 41. For a more dubious observation, see Crossette, Hong Kong
Sees the Future: Will It Work?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1984, at Al, A12; D. Lee, Hong Kong Resi-
dents Cautiously Optimistic, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1984, at A23.
20 See, e.g., Accord Welcomed by Shultz, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1984, at A12. For a report of
the reaction of Japan and Singapore, see FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE (CHINA),
Oct. 2, 1984, at G3, G4-5.
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Hong Kong collapse or wither away after assuming control of the terri-
tory. However, good intentions and sincerity alone do not necessarily
guarantee the prosperity of Hong Kong before or after 1997. A thorough
analysis of all factors relating to the future of Hong Kong would have to
cover political, economic, social and legal aspects of the question.
The purpose of this topical issue of the Case Western Reserve Jour-
nal of International Law is primarily to analyze some important legal
problems involved in this question. However, legal problems cannot be
meaningfully analyzed and understood without having some knowledge
of the background of the economic aspects of the Hong Kong question.
This is especially true for a place like Hong Kong which is a leading
commercial and financial center of the world. Therefore, the first Article
included in this collection, written by Yuan-li Wu and Y.C. Jao, deals
with the economic consequences of the transfer. After summarizing the
financial crisis and the crisis of confidence which occurred during the
1982-84 Sino-British negotiations, the Article explains the reasons for
Hong Kong's economic recovery soon after the announcement of the
Hong Kong Joint Declaration. According to the authors, the Joint Dec-
laration was greeted with relief by the Hong Kong people, though not
enthusiasm, because they realized that the alternative, a unilateral "solu-
tion" proclaimed by the PRC would be even worse. Moreover, the Chi-
nese promise of a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong and the
preservation of its existing socio-economic system and life style seems, at
least on paper, reasonable. Furthermore, the Joint Declaration also legit-
imizes British rule from 1984 to 1997, and given that in Hong Kong the
typical pay-back period for investment is about five to eight years, the
Joint Declaration insures a period during which orderly planning for the
future-including exit as an ultimate alternative-can be made.
Despite this economic recovery, many firms are preparing for the
worst. They have followed what may be called a strategy of "precaution-
ary relocation or diversification" in several ways: (a) removal of the reg-
istered head office from Hong Kong to a foreign country, especially a tax
haven; (b) establishment of branches or offices in foreign countries, or
acquisition of foreign firms in whole or in part; (c) sale of the firm's eq-
uity to a foreign firm or formation of a joint venture with a foreign firm
in Hong Kong; and (d) transfer of liquid assets abroad, leaving only
money balances enough for transaction purposes in Hong Kong. Along
with capital flight and the relocations of business, large numbers of entre-
preneurs, managers, professionals and technicians have begun to emi-
grate from Hong Kong. Therefore, the authors observe that despite the
recent recovery in the economy, a deep-seated uncertainty over the long-
term future still remains; therefore, there is no justification for projecting
the recent short-term upsurge into the more distant future.
With respect to the PRC's policy during the transition period, Wu
1988]
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and Jao observe that it has been busy on two counts: bolstering Hong
Kong whenever really necessary in order to preserve Hong Kong's eco-
nomic prospects and making sure that in the future Hong Kong will ac-
tually be governed by a pliable and obedient administration without the
interference of potentially obstructionist local political interests. To in-
sure that the second objective will be satisfied, the PRC has increased the
transfer of Communist cadres to Hong Kong and has expanded the
number of PRC-controlled enterprises there. However, this policy of
sending more cadres to Hong Kong makes post-1997 prospects more
grim as the people of Hong Kong may suspect that the PRC's so-called
"high degree of autonomy" is rhetorical only.
A more optimistic assessment of the impact of 1997 on the future of
Hong Kong is presented in Benjamin P. Fishburne's Article. According
to him, some of the ingredients of Hong Kong's success, such as its loca-
tion, infrastructure and air link in southeast Asian air traffic, are virtually
immune from political interference after 1997. In addition, he observes
that Hong Kong's legal structure does not lend itself very well to govern-
ment interference with business. Any attempt by the Chinese authorities
after 1997 to change this legal structure would meet with great difficulty,
given the likely resistance of Hong Kong's post-1997 legislature and the
business community to tampering with Hong Kong's recipe for success.
Moreover, foreign business interests in Hong Kong, to varying degrees,
will seek to preserve Hong Kong. The significant and growing number of
joint Hong K6ng-Chinese business operations will also be a force for
stability.
With respect to the concern about the departure of large numbers of
Hong Kong's best educated and most talented people, Fishburne hopes
that not all these departures are permanent and China might provide
human resources needed. On the political side, he notes that it is in
China's self-interest to keep Hong Kong viable and prosperous in the
post-1997 period as an inducement to Taiwan for eventual reunification
under the "one country, two systems" model.
V. DRAFTING THE BASIC LAW TO IMPLEMENT THE SINO-BRITISH
JOINT DECLARATION
The Joint Declaration is to be implemented by a Basic Law of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("SAR") which will be en-
acted by the PRC's National People's Congress; therefore, the Basic Law
is of vital importance in maintaining Hong Kong's prosperity in the post-
1997 period. The next four Articles in this issue deal with certain impor-
tant issues relating to the Basic Law. At the time these Articles were
written, the final draft of the Basic Law was not published though most
of its contents were already released to the public. It is believed the con-
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tents of the final draft and the Basic Law ultimately to be enacted will
not be significantly different from those provisions already released.
However, several important issues of the Basic Law have not yet been
decided. Therefore, when reading these Articles, one should bear in
mind that some analyses and conclusions must be viewed as tentative.
Emily Lau provides an overall survey of the structure of the Hong Kong
SAR. The structure of the SAR government is supposed to be based on
provisions in the Joint Declaration, yet there is only one short paragraph
in Annex I of the Joint Declaration:
The government and legislature of the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region shall be composed of local inhabitants. The chief
executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be
selected by election or through consultations held locally and be ap-
pointed by the Central People's Government. Principal officials...
shall be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and appointed by the Central People's Govern-
ment. The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion shall be constituted by elections. The executive authorities shall
abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legislature.2"
During the two years of the Basic Law drafting process it has been
demonstrated, Lau observed, that the vague principles contained in the
Joint Declaration could be subjected to wide ranging interpretations,
which sometimes might deviate significantly from the general under-
standing in 1984 that the PRC would not interfere with the SAR admin-
istration and would give it "a high degree of autonomy." At the time of
Lau's writing, the PRC has not agreed to the direct election of the SAR
chief executive, nor does the PRC make clear how the members of the
legislature will be elected. In 1987, the PRC announced its opposition to
partial direct election of the present Hong Kong legislature. Lau con-
cludes that the structure of the SAR, when formally announced, will not
adequately guarantee the "high degree of autonomy" for the SAR pro-
vided in the Joint Declaration.
The crucial issue of the constitutional relationship between the
PRC's Central People's government and the Hong Kong SAR is ana-
lyzed in Joseph Y.S. Cheng's Article. The constitutional basis of the
Hong Kong SAR is article 31 of the 1982 PRC Constitution.22 Some
Hong Kong groups pointed out that the capitalist system to be continued
in Hong Kong for fifty years after 1997 would be contrary to at least two
articles of the PRC Constitution, namely:
ARTICLE 5 The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the
socialist legal system. No law or administrative or local rules and reg-
21 Joint Declaration, supra note 16, Annex I, § I.
P.R.C. CONST. art. 31.
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ulations shall contravene the Constitution.23
ARTICLE 6 The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's
Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of pro-
duction, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective owner-
ship by the working people.
24
These groups would like the PRC to revise article 31 of the Consti-
tution to provide a more specific guarantee for the Hong Kong capitalist
system in the post-1997 period. However, as Cheng observes, the PRC
has been reluctant to even discuss the issue. On the question of "residual
powers," i.e., those powers not specifically provided in the PRC Consti-
tution or the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, the draft article 9 of the
Basic Law makes it clear that those powers belong to the PRC's National
People's Congress, its Standing Committee or the State Council, but they
may delegate those powers to the Hong Kong SAR. With respect to the
question of amending the Basic Law of Hong Kong, the draft provides
that amendment could be initiated by the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress, the State Council and the Hong Kong SAR.
The amendment has to be approved by the National People's Congress.
Thus, Cheng notes that under this arrangement the PRC would in fact
have full control of the amendment process. The power of interpretation
of the Basic Law is in the hands of the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People's Congress. In view of this arrangement on the relationship
between the PRC Central authorities and the Hong Kong SAR, Cheng
concludes that the Basic Law will offer very limited guarantees for the
political autonomy of the Hong Kong SAR.
Denis Chang's Article takes a jurisprudential approach to the issue
of the Basic Law. According to him, some of the currently encountered
difficulties in the drafting of the Basic Law for the SAR go to the very
concept and test the coherence of the two different legal systems. In
China, the moment the political norms change, the legal system has to
adjust. The norms are classified in hierarchical order: policy line, direc-
tion indicator and policy. Law is intended to implement policy as de-
fined by the Communist Party. Therefore, among the most crucial
problems in jurisprudential terms are the application of Chinese laws to
the SAR, the interpretation of the Basic Law and other matters that
touch upon the interface and differentiation of the two systems. He
hopes that as the tale of two legal systems unfolds, law will within its
proper sphere become established as a principle, a product as a means of
mediation between the two systems. This hope is unlikely to be realized
if the promises for a "high degree of autonomy" contained in the Joint
Declaration are not "solemnly kept." He, however, declines to say
23 Id. art. 5.
24 Id. art. 6.
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whether the contents of the draft Basic Law, as made public so far, have
kept the promises contained in the Joint Declaration.
In his Article, Michael C. Davis focuses on the issues facing a com-
parative legal scholar as the British common law and the Chinese civil
law systems "collide" during the drafting of the Basic Law. After ana-
lyzing the issues of the composition of the future legislature, selection of
a governor, human rights and the interpretation and implementation of
the Basic Law, he suggests a model for constitutional judicial review in
Hong Kong. Taking into account Hong Kong's unique circumstances
and the "stark contrast" between Hong Kong and China's constitutional
values, Davis proposes a bifurcated system of a decentralized incidenter
system at the local level and a centralized principaliter system to resolve
issues such as the national/local division of constitutional power.
In addition to providing analysis, Davis challenges comparative law
scholars to take advantage of the opportunity Hong Kong provides for
participation-both theoretical and practical-in the development of a
unique constitutional framework. Admittedly not the final word on the
subject, this Article sets up a valuable foundation for further develop-
ment and refinement of models of constitutional judicial review for Hong
Kong.
VI. CERTAIN LEGAL ISSUES ON TRANSFERRING HONG KONG TO
CHINA IN 1997
The next four Articles in this collection cover four specific legal
problems relating to the death penalty, extradition, international trans-
portation, and nationality and passports. At present, the death penalty is
retained in the legal systems of both Hong Kong and the PRC, as indi-
cated in Andrew Scobell's Article. However, while in the PRC death
penalties were frequently imposed, since 1966 those in Hong Kong con-
victed of crimes that carry the death penalty and sentenced to death have
had the punishment commuted to life imprisonment. Scobell suggests it
is possible that more death penalties will be imposed and carried out fol-
lowing 1997. In 1965 Great Britain enacted the Murder (Abolition of
Death Penalty) Act abolishing the death penalty for murder.25 Thus, all
death sentences have since then been commuted to life imprisonment by
the "Governor-in-Council" or more precisely the "Queen-in-Council"
(the Queen in consultation with the Privy Council in London). Annex I
of the Joint Declaration states that the system of appeal to the Privy
Council in London will be abolished and the "power of final adjudica-
tion" will rest with an appeals court in the Hong Kong SAR.26 More-
25 Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965, ch. 71, reprinted in 8 HALSBURY'S STAT-
UTES OF ENGLAND 541 (3d ed. 1969).
26 Joint Declaration, supra note 16, Annex I.
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over, a survey conducted by the University of Hong Kong indicated that
an overwhelming majority of the respondents favored the death penalty
for premeditated murder, while a majority also supported extending the
death penalty for bodily harm, armed robbery and rape. With the re-
moval of the British administration in Hong Kong in 1997, it is unlikely
that the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR, who is to be appointed
by the PRC, would routinely commute a death sentence to life
imprisonment.
At present, Hong Kong maintains extradition relations with many
countries and areas through its connection with Great Britain. Will such
relations continue after 1997 with the termination of British rule? This
issue is analyzed by Janice M. Brabyn. Hong Kong's present extradition
powers and relations are a direct consequence of its colonial status. The
British Fugitive Offenders Act of 1967 provides in section 17 for its ex-
tension to colonies' authorities to surrender persons found within their
territory to other British Commonwealth countries.2 7 The Fugitive Of-
fenders (Hong Kong) Order of 1967 extends the Act's application to
Hong Kong. 8 For non-Commonwealth countries, extradition is based
on extradition treaties concluded by Great Britain and their application
to Hong Kong through the British Extradition Act of 1870.29 A British
colony, which has achieved independence and which has become a full
member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, needs only to ask
other members of the Commonwealth to designate the new state as one
to which their Commonwealth rendition legislation applies. For treaty-
based extradition, ex-colonies can rely on the general principle of treaty
succession and, in addition, could enter into inheritance agreements or
make unilateral declarations of continuity which are normally accepted
by other treaty partners. However, Brabyn suggests that these methods
for continuing extradition relations may not be applicable to Hong Kong.
This is because, explained Brabyn, Hong Kong is not moving from colo-
nial status to independence, it is becoming a part of the PRC, a country
which has no bilateral extradition treaty with any country, though it has
ratified a few international multilateral conventions which contain provi-
sions on extradition of specific offenses such as hijacking.
The Hong Kong SAR cannot succeed to the British extradition trea-
ties as of right. Succession will depend on the willingness of the other
treaty partners. Moreover, a question exists as to whether, after 1997
when the Hong Kong SAR will no longer be associated with a Common-
27 Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, reprinted in 17 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 517 (4th
ed. 1986).
28 Fugitive Offenders (Hong Kong) Order, 1967 S.I. 1967 No. 911 as amended by S.I. 1968,
Nos. 292, 1375.
29 Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52, reprinted in 17 HALSBURY'S STATUTES of
ENGLAND 478 (4th ed. 1986).
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wealth member, will other Commonwealth countries be willing to extend
extradition relations to it? In view of this situation, Brabyn concludes
that unless special arrangements are made, it is probable that Hong
Kong's present abilities to extradite and to obtain extradition will be seri-
ously curtailed after 1997.
Gary N. Heilbronn's Article deals with a very important commer-
cial question of whether the transfer of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997
would affect Hong Kong's international air transportation relations.
During 1985-86, thirty scheduled airlines operated 55,094 passenger
flights and 3,424 cargo flights to and from Hong Kong, maintaining di-
rect links to 105 cities, 52 of them being non-stop services. Over a dozen-
scheduled (charter) air carriers operated 218 passenger and 496 cargo
ffights, with another 1,430 non-revenue ffights being made. These exten-
sive international aviation relations have been handled solely by Great
Britain. According to Heilbronn's analysis, if proper measures are taken,
there will be a continuation of Hong Kong's international aviation rela-
tions after 1997. Regarding British aviation laws now applicable to
Hong Kong, he suggests that they should be replaced by Hong Kong
legislation before 1997, then by paragraph 3 of Annex II of the Joint
Declaration that legislation would continue in force.30 With respect to
those multilateral international aviation treaties applicable to Hong
Kong through Great Britain, since the PRC is already a party to virtu-
ally all those treaties, the extension of the PRC's sovereignty to Hong
Kong in 1997 would automatically bring the application of these treaties
there under the international law principle of partial succession. As to
the question of the continuation of certain bilateral air services agree-
ments concluded by Great Britain and made applicable to Hong Kong,
they will no longer be applicable to Hong Kong after 1997. However,
the PRC has concluded many bilateral air transportation agreements
with other countries, so there should not be any difficulty for the PRC in
addressing this problem before 1997 or after.
At present, among the 5.5 million population of Hong Kong, 98%
are of Chinese origin.31 Since Chinese nationality law operates essen-
tially jure sanguinis and China does not consider Great Britain to have
acquired sovereignty in Hong Kong through unequal treaties, the popu-
lation of Chinese origin are considered as Chinese. On the other hand,
Great Britain views the whole of Hong Kong as a part of the dominion of
the Crown, so those born there are British Dependent Territories Citi-
zens (BDTC) by virtue of such birth, irrespective of ethnic origin. It is
30 Joint Declaration, supra note 16, Annex II, § 3.
31 HONG KONG 1986 (Hong Kong Government Annual Report); HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION SERVICES, HONG KONG: THE FACTS: IMMIGRATION (1986).
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estimated that there are 3.25 million BDTCs in Hong Kong.32 The re-
maining part of the population are Hong Kong residents, most of them
are of Chinese nationality. The complicated nationality laws relating to
Hong Kong are analyzed in Robin M. White's Article.
The Sino-British Joint Declaration and its Annexes do not itself re-
fer directly to the nationality issue. It is only mentioned in the Chinese
Memorandum appended to the Joint Declaration. In the memorandum,
it is stated that "under the Nationality Law of the People's Republic of
China, all Hong Kong Chinese compatriots, whether they are holders of
the British Dependent Territories Citizens' Passport or not, are Chinese
nationals. ' 33 In Annex I of the Joint Declaration, the residents of Hong
Kong, whether they are BDTCs or not, are guaranteed of their right to
travel and return.34 The arrangement on the nationality issue probably
has "extracted as many concessions as it could" from the Chinese side,
White concludes.
In accordance with international practice, a person who travels
abroad only needs one travel document, i.e., his or her passport. In the
case of the Hong Kong SAR after 1997, a permanent resident of Hong
Kong will normally hold dual passports from among the five types of
travel documents in addition to a British or third country nationality
passport. These travel documents are:
1) The British National (Overseas) Passport, this document is cur-
rently used by Hong Kong residents for international travel. This pass-
port is issued for a ten-year period. A holder of this passport may use it
after 1997 until its expiration date, but it will not be renewable.
2) The British Overseas Citizen Passport ("BOC"), this document
is issued primarily to non-Chinese ethnic minorities in Hong Kong. Af-
ter 1997, the BOC status would be transmissible for two generations to
dependents of the holders if they would otherwise be stateless.
3) A Hong Kong Certificate of Identity ("COI") is now issued to
about one million Hong Kong residents who are not considered as Brit-
ish dependent territories citizens. The COI will continue to be issued by
the Hong Kong government before 1997 and normally for a ten year
period. It can be used after 1997 until its expiration date.
4) A Hong Kong SAR Passport will be issued by the Hong Kong
SAR government to Chinese residents in Hong Kong after 1997.
5) Travel Documents of the Hong Kong SAR will be issued by the
Hong Kong SAR government to non-Chinese residents in Hong Kong
after 1997.
32 HONG KONG: THE NATIONALITY PROVISIONS OF THE HONG KONG ACT 1985: A DRAFT
ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1986, Cmnd. No. 9637.
33 Joint Declaration, supra note 16, Exchange, Chinese Memorandum.
34 Id. Annex I.
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White also examines these classes of documents and related nationality
issues.
VII. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE-THE SINO-PORTUGUESE
NEGOTIATION ON THE MACAO QUESTION
The last Article in this issue, written by Jaw-ling Joanne Chang,
deals with distinctive features of the PRC's negotiating behavior in the
settlement of the Macao issue. While there are many articles dealing
with the Hong Kong issue, Chang's Article is the only comprehensive
analysis of the PRC-Portugal settlement of the Macao question. In 1557,
China agreed to Portuguese settlements in Macao but still retained Chi-
nese sovereignty there. Rent was paid to China by the Portuguese for the
territory until 1849. In the Protocol of Lisbon of 1887, Portugal's right
of "perpetual occupation" was recognized by China."5 In a protocol
signed by Portuguese officials in Macao and the leftist organizations
there in 1967, the PRC gained substantial leverage in influencing Ma-
cao's affairs. In the Sino-Portuguese negotiation on the Macao question
conducted between 1986 and 1987, only two major issues became contro-
versial. The first one was the transfer date. The PRC originally wanted
to take over both Macao and Hong Kong at the same time in 1997. Por-
tugal, on the other hand, wanted to return Macao to China after 2000. A
compromise was reached to return Macao on December 31, 1999. The
second issue was more serious. Portugal allows dual nationality, but the
PRC does not. There are approximately 100,000 ethnic Chinese in Ma-
cao having Portuguese passports, about a fifth of Macao's population.
Portugal would like to preserve their rights in Macao as Portuguese citi-
zens, despite the fact that under PRC law they should be considered Chi-
nese since they were born in a territory which the PRC has never
conceded to be Portuguese territory, though administered by Portugal
with Chinese tolerance. Finally, a compromise was reached under which
these dual nations will use Portugal's passports for international travel.
Portugal will not exercise consular protection to them while they are in
Macao and the PRC. The second part of Chang's Article deals with the
PRC's negotiating tactics and post-negotiation maneuvers. Since the im-
plementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong re-
quires negotiating many transition agreements between the two countries
before 1997, this section of Chang's Article should be useful to scholars
and practitioners involved in such negotiations.
35 BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NoTEs, MACAU 3 (Oct.
1982).
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VIII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The Hong Kong question involves many legal problems and it is not
possible to deal with all of them in this issue. However, this topical issue
does cover some of the most important legal issues which may inspire
others to carry on further research on the subject. The Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law is to be congratulated for organiz-
ing and editing this interesting and valuable issue on the question of
Hong Kong.
